The granting of amnesties has now become a cornerstone of peacebuilding efforts in societies emerging from conflict. Yet, the impact of the role of religion and ethnicity in determining attitudes towards such arrangements has not been empirically assessed.
INTRODUCTION
The post-cold war era has witnessed a proliferation of intrastate conflicts based on ethnic differences. Intrastate conflicts, or civil wars, have now replaced interstate conflicts, or international wars, as the most prevalent forms of violence.
1 Currently, around 95 per cent of wars are civil wars, the large majority of which are considered ethnic conflicts, although what exactly constitutes an ethnic conflict is open to much dispute. 2 Moreover, as Collier et al point out, 3 once they break out, civil wars are difficult to stop: about half of the countries emerging from civil war slip back into violence within five years, and this pattern is particularly marked when the antagonists are mobilized along ethnic lines. 4 It is important to note, however, ethnic conflicts are not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, ethnic wars have been a common form of armed conflicts around the world. Even today, within-country conflicts based on ethnic divisions are considered one of the most pervasive and deadly forms of war. While there is evidence to suggest that the number of such conflicts have declined considerably in recent years -most notably since their earlier peak in the mid-1990s 5 -ethnic conflict is still considered one of the greatest threats to international security in the world today. 6 While much has been written on the nature, extent and causes of ethnic conflict, its relationship to religion remains relatively unexplored. As a number of scholars have noted, classic studies of ethnicity, ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflict have paid little attention to religion, viewing it as either irrelevant or marginal at best. 7 Pointing instead to the role of a range of economic and/or political influences -such as ethnic grievances and fractionalisation, greed, relative deprivation and repression, the political organisations of minority groups and their desire for self-determinationtraditional studies of ethnic conflict suggest that it is these factors, and not religion, which are the primary, if not sole, determinants of ethnic rebellion and conflict. 8 Yet,
the absence of such attention as to the role of religion must be considered surprising for the following reasons.
First, not only do many ethnic conflicts have a strong religious dimension but religion and ethnicity as a source of identity are often deeply intertwined. In fact, not only is religion often included in definitions of ethnicity but most conflict analysts treat religion as a subset of ethnicity. 9 Second, contrary to the views of secularisation theorists that religion would either wither away or retreat to the private sphere as a result of modernisation, 10 there is evidence to suggest that not only have religious conflicts significantly increased more than nonreligious conflicts, particularly since the 1980s, but conflicts involving religious factors are more intense and intractable in nature. 11 In fact, some scholars argue that not only has modernity and its accompanying insecurity led to the revival of religion but that religiously motivated violence has now become an ubiquitous element of modern conflicts and the dominant form of terrorism in the world today.
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While more recent research has focused on the relationship between religion and ethnic conflict, the relationship between religion, ethnicity and transitional justice mechanisms has remained largely unexplored. This is particularly the case when we consider the influence of ethnonationalism and religious conviction on attitudes towards amnesty. The absence of such research may be considered surprising for many reasons. First, amnesties have become a central feature of transitional justice efforts in societies emerging from conflict. In fact, the granting of amnesties has now moved centre stage as the most frequently used transitional justice mechanism for societies emerging from conflict. 13 Secondly, in addition to political elites, many of whom had been involved in the conflict that preceded the political settlement, religious leaders have also been actively engaged in the establishment and delivery of such transitional justice mechanisms. As a number of scholars point out, not only have religious personnel played a crucial role in mediating between political elites and the mass public in establishing post-conflict peace agreements, they have also been key players in the design and delivery of transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions and the granting of amnesties. 14 In fact, at least as far as the South Africa is concerned, some scholars go so far as to suggest that the involvement of religious leaders in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the inclusion of a religious discourse was both a vital and necessary step in facilitating its political stability and transition to a sustainable and peaceful democracy.
15
In summary, views on the role of religion and ethnicity in relation to both conflict generation and prevention remain highly contested. While some scholars point to the over-arching effects of ethnicity, viewing religion as marginal at best, others point to the primacy of religion as both a source of conflict and of reconciliation within society. It is with these competing views in mind that this article focuses on the role of religion and ethnonational identity in determining public attitudes towards amnesty in Northern Ireland. The article proceeds in two stages. 28 In fact, some scholars go so far as to suggest that since the ratification of the Agreement, religious identity and practices have now moved centre stage as the key factor in both maintaining and perpetuating sectarian division within this society. 29 More recent research, however, points to the intersection of religion and ethnicity in both generating and/or ameliorating communal division and conflict within this society. Rejecting either the assumed irrelevance or subordinate position of religion, proponents of this perspective suggest that not only is religious identity and ethnic identity closely intertwined in Northern Ireland, but both religious identity and ethnicity can exert an independent effect on communal division. 30 However, as a number of scholars have noted, the relative importance attached to each identity -or the extent to which ethnicity and religion are 'thick' or 'thin' -can vary between groups as well as across social contexts. 31 In other words, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is not clear-cut. While religion can, in some cases, dampen the effect of ethnicity and, thereby, assume salience in terms of communal unity or division, in other situations, it can help to reinforce and enhance the salience of ethnicity by identifying the 'other', or those outside the ethnic group. Mitchell's study of the effect of religion and ethnicity on working-class loyalists demonstrates that not only can religion be used by individuals for ethnic ends, such as a justification for the use of violence in those cases when religion and ethnicity come in conflict, but religion can also have a transformative effect or, in this case, overriding opposing ethnic lineages in the attempt to forge a unifying community of faith. 32 Mitchell, in summarising the influence of both religious and ethnicity, writes: 'Religious ideas push and pull against ethnic ideas in the lives of individuals. It is rarely as straightforward as one causing the other. The tendency of religion to flux, fuse and sometimes jar demonstrates a lack of dominance of one element over the other.'
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In summary, the role of both religion and ethnonationalism in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland remains a contested and complex issue. While some scholars stress the primacy of ethnonationalism, others point to the crucial role of religion as a key mechanism for both generating and resolving conflict within this society. Still others, point to the independent effect of both religion and ethnic identity on communal cohesion and division within this society. It is with these considerations in mind that we now turn to an investigation of the net influence of religion and ethnonationalism on attitudes toward amnesty. A key focus of our investigation is to assess empirically the degree to which both ethnicity and religion may be considered a key determinant of views.
DATA AND METHODS
The God (see Appendix Table A1 ). 34 Previous, predominantly US-based, survey research on the relationship between religion and attitudes towards a range of moral views, including attitudes towards capital punishment and the use of more stringent sanctions for convicted criminals, suggest that each of these measures has an important, albeit divergent, influence on attitudes. 35 Of these various religious measures, however, it is the rigidity of one's belief in and perceptions of God, and not religious practices or even biblical literalism, which emerges as the primary determinant of views. 36 For example, while a range of studies demonstrated that holding a rigid, or a definite, belief is God is a significant positive predictor of having a retributive attitude regarding criminal punishment and the death penalty, 37 others point to the consistently negative effect of perceptions of a gracious God in relation to such views. 38 Ethnonationalism, our other primary explanatory variable of interest, was operationalised in terms of congruency in religious, national, and communal identity. 39 As previous research has shown, although national identity and communal affiliation significantly overlap in both religious communities in Northern Ireland, they are by no means coterminous. 40 For example, not all Protestants perceived themselves as British and/or adopt a Unionist label. Similarly, not all Catholics view themselves as Irish or chose a Nationalist label. In Northern Ireland, religious affiliation, national identity and communal affiliation, including territorial preferences, were intertwined in a complex way which not only provided the basis for the conflict but, until recently, also reinforced its violent and recurrent nature. 41 To allow for this factor, ethnonationalism is operationalised in terms of congruencyProtestants who perceive themselves as both British and Unionist and Catholics who are willing to see themselves as both Irish and Nationalist -in ethnonational selfidentification. As in recent survey research, whereas 46 per cent of Protestants were willing to choose both identities and regard themselves as British and unionists, 48
per cent of Catholics were willing to describe themselves as both Irish and Nationalist. 42 In addition, we included a number of potentially confounding background control variables such as gender, marital status, age, educational attainment and, most notably, victimhood status, given its highly contested and problematic nature both in Northern Ireland and in other societies emerging from conflict. 43 Alternative analysis which excluded self-perceptions of victimhood from the investigation demonstrated no substantive difference in finding. With the exception of age (coded in terms of years) all control variables were included as a series of dummy variables (coded 0 and 1) in the analyses.
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we use ordinary least squares analysis to consider the net effect of religious identity on attitudes towards amnesty.
This shows significant differences in relation to this issue between the two religious communities. Secondly, we then investigate the net impact of a range of religious measures -religious practices, beliefs in and about God -and congruency in ethnonational identity on attitudes towards amnesty within the two communities.
Given the skewed nature of our dependent variable within the two religious communities -the majority of which are opposed to amnesty -for the purposes of this investigation attitudes towards amnesty has been recoded to the following two categories: strongly oppose/oppose (coded 1) and neither support nor The data in Table 1 lends some further support to this view. Irrespective of whether the Catholic or Protestant population are considered, the vast majority of individuals -or just under two-thirds in this instance -remain opposed to the granting of amnesty to ex-combatants. For example, whereas around a quarter of individuals were strongly opposed to such an initiative, a further two fifths also expressed an oppositional view. By contrast, only a minority of individuals, or around a fifth in each case, either supported or were undecided in their attitudes. Moreover, the strength of support for such an initiative is extremely tepid at best; just three per cent strongly supported the granting of amnesty to ex-combatants as compared to 26 per cent who were strongly opposed to such an approach. As expected, however, there are some marked differences between the two main religious communities in relation to this issue, with Catholics being notably less oppositional in their opinion than Protestants. While just over half of all Catholics adopted a more retributive or negative stance in relation to the granting of amnesty for those who admitted to carrying out acts of violence during the conflict, the equivalent proportion among Protestants was markedly higher at 77 per cent.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Table 2 lends further confirmation to these findings. Even when a range of socio-demographic control variables as well as self-perceptions of victimhood are included in a regression analysis, religious identity emerges as a strong and differential net predictor of attitudes towards amnesty. Catholics are significantly less likely to adopt an oppositional stance in relation to this issue than Protestants. This is not to suggest, however, that religious identity is the sole determinant of attitudes in this instance. Other noteworthy predictors, net of other factors, include the positive effect of gender (women being more likely to oppose such an initiative than men) and the negative effect of victimhood status (victims were significantly less likely to adopt an oppositional stance in relation to amnesty than non-victims).
[Insert Table 2 about here] To what extent, however, does the influence of religion endure when the impact both of a range of religious measures as well as ethnonational identity is investigated separately within the two main religious communities? Moreover, as suggested earlier, of the various religious measures, is it one's belief in and about God, which is the primary factor in accounting for views? Table 3 God and not religious practices that are the most consistent determinants of views.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Focusing initially on the Catholic population, the results in Table 3 More recent research, however, rejects the singularity of both these approaches. Focusing instead on the combined impact of both religion and ethnicity on conflict, proponents of this perspective argue that not only are religion and ethnicity deeply intertwined, but a key factor in accounting for intra-state conflicts based on ethnic differences is both their religious and ethnic dimensions. In other words, it is the intersection and combination of these two factors -both religion and national identity -which are the two most dominant features in predicting the onset of ethnonational disputes, or conflicts based on ethnic differences, in the post-Cold War era. And, while both religion and ethnonationalism are considered to have an independent net effect on such intra-state conflicts, the degree to which either religion or ethnnonationalist aspirations is the primary motivator of conflict remains open to some dispute. While some analysts point to the dominance of ethnonationalism, others highlight the religious dimension.
The results of our investigation lend some further support to this dualistic view 
